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THREE YEARS OF CHANGE: RECENT COURT
CASES UNDER THE VIDEO PRIVACY
PROTECTION ACT
In a world of ever-increasing connectivity the United States
continues to adapt its laws to protect privacy rights. With more
and more frequency Silicon Valley is spawning new intemet
companies that profit primarily, or even solely, on their ability to
provide third parties with targeted marketing data on their users.
Last year saw Facebook post record profits,' while Alphabet -
Google's parent company - began to rival Apple for the title of
World's most valuable company.2 A notable similarity between
Google and Facebook is that they don't actually sell or rent any
goods to consumers. Instead, they sell a service to third parties in
the form of targeted marketing data on their users. Since 2012 the
government and the courts have begun to address another possible
provider of such information, video streaming services. These past
three years have seen an attempt by all three branches of
government to drag the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) into
the modem era.
Recent efforts have shown an attempt to bring the thirty-
year-old privacy law to the modem era of Internet streaming.
Unlike the brick and mortar video stores that existed at the
VPPA's inception, the modem marketplace contains millions of
sources for paid, free, subscription, and non-subscription based
videos. By using such sources of entertainment, the consumer may
unwittingly be allowing websites to share and profit from their
viewing history. To date, no litigation has progressed to trial on
streaming and the VPPA, but the frequency of the cases and their
potential ramifications warrant a discussion in the legal
community. This paper looks to briefly address the recent cases,
determine where the law stands today, and to briefly discuss what
this means for consumers as potential future litigants.
' Facebook Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2015, FACEBOOK (Jan. 27,
2016), http://investor.Jb.com/releasedetail.cfm ?ReleaselD=952040.
2 John Shinal, Alphabet vs. Apple: Two Stocks Enter, One Leaves, USA TODAY
(Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/shinal/2016/
02/02/alphabet-vs-apple-two-stocks-enter-one-leaves/79685542/.
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HISTORY OF THE ACT:
The birth of the VPPA dates back to the late 1980's and is
entwined with the legal system in an interesting way. During the
nomination hearings for Supreme Court candidate Robert Bork a
D.C. area newspaper obtained a copy of his family's video rental
history and published a profile of Bork based upon the movies on
the list. While probably better remembered in the legal
community for his scholarly works on antitrust law than for his
failed Supreme Court nomination - or any of the unremarkable
movies found on his rental history - the newspaper's disclosure
of the list prompted swift action to protect consumer privacy in the
area of video rentals. Perhaps the journalist that obtained the list
and wrote the piece was motivated by Bork's strict
constitutionalism approach and felt that the piece spoke out against
the jurist's opinion that citizens only had those rights that were
provided to it by the constitution and the legislature.' Regardless
of the motive, Congress passed the VPPA and the President signed
it into law in 1988.
The 1988 version of the VPPA protected the viewing
histories of consumers by preventing video rental stores from
disseminating information about its customers. Originally the law
protected agaiist the "wrongful disclosure of video tape rental or
sale records" by "Video Tape Service Providers." Congress
updated the aging law in 2012 when it drafted and passed
amendments to the VPPA in the form of H.R. 6671, which was
signed into law by President Obama in January of 2013. 4
Congress added Internet companies to the VPPA's definition of
video providers and allowed providers to share viewing history
with social networks if the individual gives their written consent.'
H.R. 6671 has been heavily lobbied for by Netflix, which excluded
3 Andrea Peterson, How Washington's Last Remaining Video Rental Store
Changed the Course of Privacy Law, THE WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 28, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/04/28/how-
washingtons-last-remaining-video-rental -store-changed-the-course-of-privacy-
law/.
4 See H.R. 6671, ll2th Cong. (2012).
5 Id.
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the United States from its Facebook sharing feature introduced in
2011.6
VPPA's INTERPRETATION IN RECENT CASE LAW:
Following the passing and signing of the VPPA
amendments case were filed on behalf of consumers and have
shown the courts' attempts to interpret and apply the decades old
law to the modem era. The cases have primarily looked at four
areas of the VPPA. First, whether streaming and video sites fall
under the definition of "video tape service provider." Second,
whether the modem viewer of free or paid online videos fall under
the Act's definition of "consumer." Third, what constitutes
unlawful disclosure in the modem era. Fourth, what constitutes
"personally identifiable information," the information that the Act
is intended to protect. Each of these four areas has been applied to
the recent cases to handle questions that the 1 0 0 th Congress could
not have imagined in the 1980's while drafting the legislation, but
are now beginning to shape a path for the modem litigant to
navigate when pursuing VPPA claims against an internet
company.
The VPPA can only cover Internet companies if the
definition of "video tape service provider" is interpreted to include
such non-brick-and-mortar institutions, which provide videos in
formats far removed from the videotape. The VPPA defines a
video tape service provider as "any person, engaged in the
business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of rental,
sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar
audio visual materials. . . ." The Northern District of California
6 Peterson, supra note 3; Hayley Tsukayama, Netflix, Facebook switch on
sharing feature, THE WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/the-circuit-netflix-reaps-
benefits-of-vppa-lobbying-turns-on-social-feature/2013/03/13/71 e I dt22-8bf4-
I 1e2-b63f-f53fb9f2fcb4_blog.html; Steven Musil, Obama signs Netflix-backed
amendment to video privacy law, CNET (Jan. 10, 2013) http://www.cnet.com/
news/obama-signs-netflix-backed-amendment-to-video-privacy-law/.
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first addressed this definition's relation to internet companies in
the 2012 case In Re Hulu Litigation (Hulu 1).7
In Hulu I the court considered the alleged wrongful
disclosure of consumer information in a putative class action suit.'
In its defense Hulu claimed, inter alia, that it was not a videotape
service provider as defined by the Act.9  Specifically, Hulu
suggested that the dictionary definition of "materials" meant that
the Act was limited to the providers of physical videos."° The
court rejected this argument in this interpretation in favor of its
own interpretation of the statute. First, the court said that the plain
language reading of the statute meant that the intent was to cover
providers of "video content" regardless of "how that content was
delivered (e.g. via the internet or a brick-and-mortar store).""
Next, the court considered the dictionary definition of material and
found that in addition to the physical meaning put forth by Hulu,
the term could be used to show relation to something (i.e. reading
material) and that this meaning "comports with the court's
ordinary sense of the definition of "audio visual materials" as used
in the Act's definition of video tape service provider.12 Finally, the
court looked to the travaux prepitoire for evidence of legislative
intent. It found a senate report that showed Congress's intent to
protect private information on "viewing preferences regardless of
the business model or media format involved."13 To be sure that
the VPPA's protections would retain their force even as
technology evolved included similar audio-visual material in the
definition. 14  Based on this, the court found that Hulu was a
"provider" under the Act. 5
Even if an Internet company is a videotape service
provider, the plaintiff must be a "consumer" as defined by the Act
' In re Hulu Privacy Litig., (Hulu 1), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112916 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 10, 2012).
8 Id. at *2.
9 Id.
10 Id. at *12-4.
11 Id. at *16.
12 Id. at *16-7.
13 Id., citing S. Rep. No. 100-599 at 1.
14 Id. at *18, citing S. Rep. No. 100-599 at 12.
15 Id. at *18-9.
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in order to have standing. Consumer is defined as "any renter,
purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services from a video tape
service provider. ' 16 The court in Hulu I also addressed this aspect
of the act in its decision. Particularly, the parties and the court
looked at "subscriber" because it was undisputed that the plaintiffs
had not paid for any of Hulu's services.' 7 While the defendant
argued that subscriber "implies payment of money" or at the very
least something "more than just visiting [the site.]" The plaintiffs
claimed, "they signed up for a Hulu account, became registered
users, received a Hulu ID, established Hulu profiles, and used
Hulu's video streaming services."' 8  The court held that the
plaintiffs properly plead more than simply visiting the site and that
the term subscriber does not imply payment.'9 Therefore the
Plaintiffs in Hulu I met the Act's definition of consumer, but the
court declined the opportunity to create a bright line rule, leaving
the general standard for subscriber to mean something more than a
visitor to the site but less than a paid user.
In 2015 the definition of consumer was at the crux of two
notable cases where the plaintiff was held not to be a subscriber °.2
First, the Southern District of New York decided the AMC case,
which illustrated Hulu Fs spectrum of users, which placed
subscribers somewhere above a simple user of a site but
somewhere below requiring a paid subscription.2 1 In AMC, the
plaintiffs use of the website was described as one in which she
visited the site to watch various videos but evidenced "no desire to
forge ties with... AMC. ' 22 Later in 2015 the 11 th circuit decided
the Cartoon Network case, where it followed the Hulu I spectrum.
The court followed a path set forth in the district court case of
Yershov, which held that downloading a free app to watch
episodes was not enough to make the user a subscriber unless it
16 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1).
17 In re Hulu Privacy at *22.
18 Id. at *22-3.
19 Id. at *23-4.
20 Austin-Spearman v. AMC Network Entm't LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45159 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS
17669 (1 lth Cir. Ga. 2015).
2! Austin-Spearman, at *18.
22 Id. at*17.
2016]
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involved "payment, registration, commitment, delivery, [] or
access to restricted content[.]" '23 Cartoon Network's holding, like
that in AMC, represent an adoption and a further refinement of the
Hulu I interpretation of subscriber.
Hulu I's final contribution to the modernization of the
VPPA can be found in its discussion of the definition of
disclosures "incident to the ordinary course of business." The
VPPA creates an exception to the disclosure prohibition in
circumstances where the disclosure occurs as a part of the ordinary
course of business.14 This is defined in the Act as "debt collection
activities, order fulfillment, request processing, and the transfer of
ownership."2 The court addressed the scope of this definition and
created a three-prong approach for properly pleading the
inapplicability of this exception. First, the plaintiff must allege
what the defendant did (i.e. transmitting personally identifiable
information about viewing history to third parties without first
obtaining plaintiffs written consent); second, the plaintiff must
identify the third parties; and third, the plaintiff should give
specific examples regarding the actions relating to at least some of
the third parties.26  So, while the court held that the true
determination of whether a disclosure is incident to the ordinary
course of business is a question of fact that can't be addressed on a
motion, it did provide proper guidance on how to plead this aspect
of the claim to help ensure it gets to trial.
The fourth and final definition addressed in the recent cases
was the definition of personally identifiable information. The act
defines personally identifiable information as including
"information which identifies a person as having requested or
obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape
service provider. ' 27 In 2004 the court of appeals of Washington
held "that the statute applies not only to physical evidence, but all
23 Cartoon Network, at * 12, citing Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network
Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 135 (D. Mass. 2015).
24 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(E).
25 Id. at (a)(4).
26 Hulu I, at *21-2.
27 18 USC 2710(a)(3).
140
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information."2 Thus entering into the period of cases addressed
here, the definition was a broad one that included the records
themselves and the information contained within them.
In 2015, the Northern District of California looked at what
the statute required in order for personally identifiable information
to be present. In that case, Hulu II, the court discussed consumers'
claims regarding Hulu knowingly transmitting personally
identifiable information to a third party. The court looked at the
question in two parts: first, when is personally identifiable
information present; and second, what does the knowledge element
of the act entail. The court reasoned that the goal of the VPPA is
not "to ban the disclosure of user or video data [but instead] it is to
ban the disclosure of information connecting a certain user to
certain videos."29  Therefore the court found that in order for
information to be personally identifiable information, it must
contain three elements: the consumer's identity, the video
material's identity, and the connection between them.3"
In Hulu II the court found that no such nexus existed.
Although Hulu transmitted both the consumers' identity and the
materials' identity, it did so separately.' Despite the fact that
these transmissions were simultaneous, there is no disclosure of
personally identifiable information if there is no evidence that
Hulu helped to establish (or reestablish) a connection between the
identities.32 "At the very least, there must be some mutual
understanding [between the provider and the third party] that there
has been a disclosure. 33
The second part of the question on disclosure, the
knowledge requirement, was also found to be unmet in Hulu II.
Hulu transmitted the separate identities to Facebook, but the
plaintiff pled no facts to show that Hulu knew the Facebook was
using its cookies to reunite those identities and thereby reestablish
2 State v. Walker, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 23 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2004).
29 In re Hulu Privacy Litig. (Hulu 1!), 86 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1095-6 (N.D. Cal.
2015).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 1096.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1097.
2016]
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the personally identifiable information. From an application and
pleading standpoint, this holding reveals two things about the
VPPA. First, in its current form the VPPA does not apply liability
to providers that do not knowingly disclose personally identifiable
information to a third party. It is not enough to, as in Hulu II,
provide the third party with the raw ingredients to concoct
personally identifiable information. The provider must know that
the third party is actually combining those ingredients in order to
access the personally identifiable information. 34 Second, from a
pleading standpoint, the plaintiff must provide facts to establish
knowledge that the defendant knowingly transmitted personally
identifiable information to a third party, or the raw ingredients for
such information that the defendant knows the third party is using
it to recreate personally identifiable information.35
SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT STATE
The previous sections provide a clear picture of where the
VPPA has been updated and in what ways it still needs
clarification. This section will briefly look at current state of the
Act and its affect on the parties of future litigation. The Courts
have developed sound interpretations for many of the Act's terms
rendered ambiguous over the years.
It is generally established that "video tape service
provider" includes Internet video providers because of legislative
intent and the plain meaning of "video materials" as used in the
statute.36 That interpretation was followed by the same district in
34 Id.; see also, Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116497 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 17, 2012), aff'd, 795 F.3d 1062 (even though Netflix knowingly
transmitted personally identifiable information to plaintiffs device where it
could be viewed by third parties it did not provide third parties with access to
that device and thus did not knowingly disclose protected information, even
though it provided the raw ingredients - personally identifiable information
and a platform viewable by third parties).
35 See Hulu II, 348 F. Supp. 3d, 1097; see also Sterk v. Redbox Automated
Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618 (7th Cir. 2014); Netfix, supra note 34 (holding that
defendants knowingly distributed personally identifiable information but it did
no violate the VPPA because of the disclosure exceptions in 2710(a)(2)).
36 See Hulu , at *7.
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the 2012 Netflix decision37 and has not yet been expressly
addressed by any circuit courts. It is worth noting, however, that
all the circuit court cases since Hulu I have addressed other terms,
such as subscriber, and have rendered decisions based on the
assumption that the defendant was a provider, while omitting
discussion of provider.38 The intent of the Act, as it was
interpreted in Hulu I and still stands, likely means that all courts
will consider downloading or streaming apps, sites, services, and
devices to be providers under the VPPA.
The definition of consumer also seems to be well
established. Essentially all cases following Hulu I have cited to it
or its progeny when defining "consumer" and its offshoot term
"subscriber." Most notably are the 9 th, 7 th, and 1 1th circuits
analyses in four 2015 cases. In Hulu Ithe 9 th circuit's analysis of
"knowingly disclosed" was only necessary if the circuit agreed
with the lower court's decision that Hulu was a provider and the
plaintiff was a consumer. Likewise, that same court's holding in
Netflix rested solely on the fact that the plaintiff was a consumer
and therefore allowed to receive disclosures of her own personally
identifiable information. In the 7 th circuit an analysis of the
disclosure of plaintiffs personally identifiable information was
only necessary if the court agreed that the plaintiff and defendant
were consumer and provider respectively. Finally, the 1 1 th circuit's
Cartoon Network case saw the appellate court correct the lower
court by agreeing with Hulu 's reasoning on the definition of
subscriber and distinguishing that case from the facts in Hulu L
Like the definition of provider, the definition of subscriber, and
therefore consumer, seem to be agreed upon by the various circuits
of the United States that have addressed it. In short, a consumer is
any renter, buyer, or subscriber; and a subscriber is determined on
a case by case basis but definitely requires more than simply using
37 Netflix, at *6.
38 See Mollett v. Netflix, 795 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2015) (9th circuit case
upholding the lower court's finding without addressing the definition of
provider); Cartoon Network, supra note 20 (where the 11 th circuit distinguished
that plaintiffs actions from plaintiff's actions in Hulu I in order to find that the
plaintiff was not a subscriber, but it did not address whether the defendant was a
provider).
2016]
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a site or downloading and application, and does not require the
payment of money.
The definition of personally identifiable information is the
least ambiguous definition within the Act and, as such, has only
been minimally addressed by the courts. The Act defines
personally identifiably information as that which "identifies a
person as having requested or obtained specific video materials."39
From that language Hulu II developed a bright line test that
requires the information disclosed to: (1) identify the consumer,
(2) identify the video material, and (3) establish a connection
between (1) and (2). 4o As this case has only recently been decided
there is no trail of citing cases to support or apply the test, but
given that it is simply a distillation of the statutory language it will
likely stand and be clearly applied the near future.
Finally, the remaining question is what constitutes a
disclosure in the modem era. The 2012 congressional amendments
and the House Resolution make it possible for consumers to give
prior written informed consent for the disclosure of their
personally identifiable information in certain instances.41 Absent
such consent, the parties must look next to the Act in order to
determine if the disclosure falls under one of the 2710 exceptions
for disclosures in the ordinary course of business (b)(2)(E), which
includes "debt collection activities, order fulfillment, request
processing, and the transfer of ownership. ' 42 Finally, the parties
need to consider the knowledge requirement, which, under, Hulu
II, mandated that the defendant either know it was transmitting
personally identifiable information to a third party or that the
defendant know that the information it was transmitting to the
third party was being reassembled into personally identifiable
information.
" Hulu II, at 1096 (emphasis in original), citing 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3).
41 Id. at 1095.
41 18 U.S.C. 2710(b)(2)(B).
42 18 U.S.C. 2710(a)(4).
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CONCLUSION
The current state of the VPPA creates a much clearer
pathway for filing claims under the Act, but it still has the potential
to result in splits amongst the various circuits. A thorough analysis
of the various cases provides a picture of the emerging trend that
follows the 2012 Hulu I case. From that initial decision we see the
beginnings of a three-year slog towards adapting the VPPA to
modem use. There has yet to be a large rift in the cases that have
emerged, but that may change in the near future as litigants
become more aware of what elements are required to get a claim to
trial. With such important terms as "subscriber" still being left to a
case-by-case interpretation, there could develop a schism between
the circuits that would require action by the Supreme Court. Given.
the number of cases filed in the past three years and the potentially
lucrative nature of such putative class actions to plaintiffs and
firms, it is likely that the next three years will see a number of
cases filed. Whether they will solidify or divide the courts on
application of the VPPA's terms must remain to be seen.
Chris King*
* J.D. Candidate 2016, DePaul University College of Law.
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